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W
hat  can  evolutionary  biology  offer  to  our 
understanding of anxiety and depression? According 
to 2 articles in this issue, a lot.1,2 Both include details and 
debates that could easily obscure their shared crucial main 
point—the capacities for anxiety and mood were shaped 
by natural selection because they have been useful. Like 
sweating,  pain,  and  cough,  emotions  are  only  useful  in 
certain situations, so natural selection shaped them in tight 
conjunction with regulation mechanisms that express them 
when they are likely to be useful.3 High body temperature 
arouses sweating, tissue damage arouses pain, and foreign 
material in the respiratory tract arouses cough. People who 
lack these response capacities are likely to die young. So 
are people who express them too readily, too intensely, or 
too long. Regulation mechanisms have been finely tuned by 
millions of years of selection.
However, spending a day in the clinic suggests that the 
designer of the systems that regulate anxiety and mood must 
have been having a very bad day. Any engineer responsible 
for  such  apparently  slipshod  design  would  certainly  be 
subject to legal action!
So, what is the problem? Is natural selection too weak to do 
better? Evolutionary medicine suggests that this is only 1 of 
6 reasons why selection has left us vulnerable to diseases.4,5 
Two others, emphasized in these articles,1,2 are that some 
conditions that seem like diseases are actually defences, 
and that every trait is subject to trade-offs; making it better 
in one respect will make it worse in others.
Dr Melissa Bateson, Dr Ben Brilot, and Dr Daniel Nettle1 
provide a sophisticated analysis of the trade-offs involved 
in  regulating  anxiety.  They  begin  by  explaining  that 
evolutionary  and  mechanistic  explanations  are  equal 
partners  in  any  complete  biological  explanation.  This 
foundation  from  basic  behavioural  biology  should  be 
familiar to readers; if not, the first chapter of any animal 
behaviour textbook will explain. The authors proceed to 
argue that anxiety can be useful. This is not controversial, 
and is already the foundation for much work on anxiety 
disorders,6–8  although  research  documenting  the  benefits 
of normal anxiety is overwhelmed by studies showing the 
costs of anxiety disorders.
They next apply signal detection theory to calculate the 
optimal signal threshold for expressing an anxiety response. 
The mathematical foundation they provide is essential, but 
a simple example illustrates the smoke detector principle. 
You are a hunter-gatherer at a watering hole. You hear an 
animal behind a small hill. The noise could have been made 
by a lion, or by a monkey. Should you flee? Noises made 
by lions are generally louder, so it depends on how loud the 
noise is, the relative prevalence of monkeys and lions in the 
area, and the cost of fleeing versus the cost of not fleeing if 
a lion is really there. If the cost of fleeing—that is, a panic 
attack—is about 200 calories, and the average cost of not 
fleeing in the presence of a lion is about 200 000 calories, 
then you should flee if the sound is loud enough to make the 
probability of a lion’s presence greater than 1/1000. This 
means that 999 times out of 1000 your panic response will 
be a false alarm, but nonetheless normal.
When I first did this calculation, I could hardly believe 
it. Ever since, I have found it valuable in the clinic. I had 
previously explained to patients that their panic symptoms 
were not caused by heart problems but by a disease, panic 
disorder; most listened politely, and then went for more 
cardiac tests. Now I tell patients that a panic attack is a 
normal response that is useful in the face of life-threatening 
danger, and panic disorder results from false alarms in that 
system, some of which are to be expected, just as they are 
in smoke detectors. I also explain that experiencing panic 
attacks makes the world seem more dangerous, lowering 
the anxiety threshold, thus causing a vicious circle. Most 
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patients  deeply  appreciate  this  evolutionary  explanation; 
for some, it is a sufficient intervention.
Dr Bateson and colleagues1 then advance our understanding 
with an analysis of how selection would have shaped a 
second-order  mechanism  that  adjusts  the  threshold  as  a 
function of experience. They conclude that when threats 
are common, or coping ability is limited, the system should 
lower the threshold. This is what we see in the clinic, and 
the authors review supporting epidemiologic evidence. The 
authors also suggest that their analysis should encourage 
clinicians to help patients to change their beliefs about the 
probability that a danger is present, and their ability to cope 
with it. These are, of course, already staples of cognitive-
behavioural  therapy. What  is  curious  is  how  weak  such 
interventions  often  are,  compared  with  simple  exposure 
therapy. I once wondered if patients with anxiety disorders 
may simply view life’s risks more accurately than other 
people;  however,  the  data  showed  that  their  objective 
assessments  of  risk  were  identical  to  those  of  control 
subjects; the problem is not in logical cognition, it is in the 
intensity of the anxiety response.9
The clinical utility of the capacity for low mood is harder 
to see than that of anxiety. From a clinician’s point of view, 
it can be easy to dismiss the whole idea that anything about 
depression could be useful. Depression traps people in their 
current circumstances, keeps them from doing things that 
would  improve  their  lives,  causes  untold  misery,  and  is 
far too often fatal. For these reasons, I avoid writing about 
the utility of depression, per se; instead, I emphasize the 
need to understand the capacity for normal low mood as 
the missing foundation for understanding mood disorders. 
Dr Edward H Hagen’s article2 nicely summarizes the main 
proposals about how low mood can be useful. I wish he had 
put more emphasis on the importance of the core question 
of why the capacity for mood exists, instead of jumping 
right into explaining depression, and even major depressive 
disorder.  Natural  selection  does  not  shape  diseases,  it 
shapes traits that make us vulnerable to disease; keeping 
this distinction straight is crucial.10 Dr Hagen2 is aware of 
this; his thesis is that the symptoms of major depression 
could have adaptive functions, even suicidality. I think the 
extreme version of this thesis is unlikely, but it should not be 
dismissed out of hand. Reading his work has made me think 
more deeply about why it is that seriously depressed people 
so  often  become  preoccupied  with  their  worthlessness, 
and so often convinced that the world would be better off 
without them.
Some readers will wonder which evolutionary explanation 
is correct, or even: Why can’t these scientists make up their 
minds? Work in this area is difficult. First, it can be hard to 
combine various methods to arrive at a strong test. Second, 
multiple  answers  can  be  correct;  emotions  have  many 
functions, each of which can offer a selective advantage. 
Third, it is not clear that depression is all one thing. Different 
causes can be responsible in different cases: demoralization, 
loss, distorted thinking, manipulation, being manipulated, 
being  devalued  by  a  social  group,  inflammation,  drugs, 
and  primary  brain  abnormalities. Worse,  in  many  cases, 
a  full  explanation  requires  analyzing  how  these  factors 
interact with each other over time to explain an individual’s 
symptoms.  Instead  of  being  a  problem,  this  complexity 
helps to explain why it is so important for clinicians to do 
what many do well already—investigating all the details 
of an individual’s life, psychology, brain, and symptoms to 
understand why this person may be especially vulnerable to 
depression, and what accounts for this episode.
As for the need to avoid a brave new world, Dr Hagen’s 
point that drugs can interfere with adaptive responses is 
important and correct, but not clinically informed.2 Much of 
what general medicine does is to use medications to block 
normal defensive responses, such as pain, cough, and fever. 
We can do this safely most of the time because the body 
has redundant defences that are regulated by mechanisms 
shaped according to the smoke detector principle. Dr Hagen 
is correct that we should, like other physicians, investigate 
what  may  be  arousing  symptoms  before  jumping  to  the 
conclusion  that  they  come  from  abnormal  mechanisms.2 
Some  have  argued  that  medication  treatment  for  mental 
disorders  is  justified  because  they  are  caused  by  brain 
abnormalities.  This  unnecessarily  limits  the  use  of 
treatments in psychiatry that can, as in the rest of medicine, 
relieve  enormous  suffering  by  blocking  normal  aversive 
responses that may not be necessary for this individual in 
the current situation.
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